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INTRODUCTION

To combat what it considers discrimination by companies
against employees who have domestic partners instead of spouses,
the San Francisco City Council enacted the Domestic Partner Ordinance. The ordinance, which took effectJune 1, 1997, requires all
entities doing business with the City of San Francisco to provide the
same benefits (e.g., health, retirement) to domestic partners of employees as they do to spouses of employees.' While San Francisco's is
the first such ordinance in the United States, it is not likely to be the
last. It has been reported that New York, Los Angeles, New Orleans,
Seattle, and West Hollywood are considering following San Francisco's lead.2
These cities, like a growing number of cities nationwide, desire
to exert greater influence over social issues. Their attempt to do so
by affecting employee benefits, however, faces a major obstacle in
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the
federal law regulating employee benefit plans. ERISA preempts state
and local laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans.4 Indeed, sevAssistant Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. B.A., University
of Wisconsin, 1985; J.D., with honors, University of Chicago, 1988. The author
would like to thankJohn Tuskey for his helpful comments and editorial suggestions
on an earlier draft of this Article. In addition, the author would also like to thank
DavidJarrell for his excellent research and editorial assistance.
See SAN FRANcisco, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12B (1997).
2 See Linda Himelstein, Going Beyond City Limits? Municipalities Are
Exercising
Their Clout on Social Issues-And Business Is Balking, Bus. WK.,July 7, 1997, at 98; Ellen Neuborne, One in Ten Firms Extends Benefits to Life Partners,USA TODAY, Jan. 24,
1997, at 1B; see also How to Succeed in Business (CNBC television broadcast, July 5,
1997).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1997).
4 See id. § 1144.
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eral companies and trade organizations have already filed suit challenging San Francisco's ordinance, claiming that the ordinance is
5
unenforceable as it is preempted by ERISA.
What makes the issue intriguing is not only that cities throughout the country are considering enacting ordinances like San Francisco's, but that they are doing so at the very time the meaning and
scope of ERISA's preemption clause is in most doubt. In the last
three years, the Supreme Court has decided three major ERISA preemption cases.6 Two were decided in 1997. In each, the Court distanced itself from its pre-1995 interpretation of ERISA's preemption
clause and significantly limited its scope. Has the scope of preemption been rolled back so far that San Francisco-style domestic partner
ordinances survive its reach?
This Article addresses this question in three sections. Part One
discusses background information relevant to the question, including a description of both (1) San Francisco's Domestic Partner Ordinance and (2) ERISA and its preemption clause. Part Two describes the changing face of ERISA preemption. It examines both
ERISA preemption as the Supreme Court viewed it before 1995 and
the Court's new approach developed in its last three preemption decisions. Part Three addresses the question of whether ERISA preempts San Francisco-style ordinances in light of the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncements. It concludes that while the reach of preemption has been rolled back to some extent, it has not been rolled
back that far. San Francisco's ordinance-and other similar ordinances in the works-are unenforceable.
I.
A.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

San FranciscoDomestic PartnerOrdinance
1. The Ordinance Itself

Because the San Francisco ordinance is the first of its kind and
is viewed as a model by other cities, it is important to understand
precisely what the ordinance does. The ordinance was passed in No5 See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. City & County of San Francisco, No.
C-97-1763 CW (N.D. Cal. filed May 13, 1997); PM&M Elec., Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. C-97-2250 CW (N.D. Cal. filedJune 17, 1997).
6 See generally DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct.
1747 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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vember 1996 and took effect on June 1, 1997. The practical effect of
the ordinance is to require all city contractors to provide the same
benefits to registered domestic partners of employees as they do to
spouses of employees.7 The text of the ordinance, however, is not
directed at contractors. Instead, it is directed at San Francisco itself
and specifies with whom the city may contract. The first section of
the ordinance, 12.B.1(b), states:
All contracting agencies of the City and County of San Francisco,
or any department thereof, acting for or on behalf of the City or
County, shall not enter into any contracts, or other agreements
involving real or personal property executed or amended on or
after the effective date of this ordinance with any contractor or
other party [hereinafter party] of said agreement that discriminates in the provision of benefits between employees with domestic partners and employees with spouses and/or between the domestic partners and spouses of such employees, where the
domestic partnership has been registered with a governmental
entity pursuant to state or local law authorizing such registration

The ordinance is thus different from those in which the city itself provides
benefits to domestic partners but does not require contractors with the city to provide such benefits. Approximately 41 cities, towns, and counties do offer benefits to
domestic partners. See Pat Kossan, Local Governments Wrangle over Health Benefits for
Partners,ARIz. REPuauc, July 27, 1997, at A4. The following is a small sample of local governments that provide such benefits: Los Angeles, San Francisco, West Hollywood, Seattle, New York, and Travis County, Texas. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake
M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1188-90 (1992).
. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12B.l(b) (1997) (alteration in original).
The ordinance also defines important terms. It defines "contract" as
an agreement for public works or improvements to be performed, or
for goods, services or supplies to be purchased, at the expense of the
City and County or to be paid out of moneys deposited in the treasury
or out of trust moneys under the control or collected by the City and
County, or for franchise, concession or lease of City property.
Id. § 12B.1 (c). The ordinance defines "contractor" as
any person or persons, firm, partnership, corporation, or combination
thereof, who submits a bid and/or enters into a contract with department heads and officers empowered by law to enter into contracts on
the part of the City and County for public works or improvements to
be performed, or for a franchise, concession or lease of City property,
or for goods, services or supplies to be purchased, at the expense of
the City and County or to be paid out of moneys deposited in the
treasury or out of trust moneys under the control or collected by the
City and County.
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"Benefits" is to be interpreted broadly. The term includes pension and health insurance benefits. In an information sheet entitled
"Frequently Asked Questions," San Francisco informs inquirers:
What Benefits Are Included?
The law applies to all benefits offered by a contractor to its employees who have spouses and all benefits offered by a contractor
to the spouses of its employees. This includes but is not limited
to: medical; disability and life insurance; retirement plans; leaves
of absence (e.g., family bereavement and parental leave); use of
company facilities (e.g., athletic facilities, libraries); and discounts
and entitlements (e.g., educational subsidies, merchandise discounts and travel passes). 9

After instructing city departments and agencies with whom they
may contract, the ordinance next prescribes required terms of "every
contract or subcontract for or on behalf of the City and County of
San Francisco." First, every contractor must agree not to discriminate in providing benefits:
The contractor or supplier [hereinafter party] shall state that it
does not, and will not during the term of the contract, discriminate in the provision of benefits between employees with domestic partners and employees with spouses, and/or between the
domestic partners and spouses of such employees, where the domestic partnership has been registered with a governmental entity pursuant to state or local law authorizing such registration.'o

Second, every contractor must agree to permit the city to audit a
wide array of documents and records to ensure that the contractor is
complying with the ordinance:
The contractor, subcontractor or supplier will permit access to
his records of employment, employment advertisements, application forms, and other pertinent data and records by the awarding
authority, the Fair Employment Practices Commission or the San
Francisco Human Rights Commission, for the purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions of this contract, and on request, provide evidence that he
or she has or will comply with the nondiscrimination provisions
of this contract.

9 The City of San Francisco, Non-discrimination in City Contracts-Domestic
Partners, Frequently Asked Questions 1 (1997) (on file with author).
10 SAN FRANCIsco, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12B.2(b) (alteration in original).
n Id. § 12B.2(g).
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Third, the ordinance spells out what happens if a contractor
breaches the nondiscrimination provisions of the agreement. First,
it may be subject to liquidated damages:
There may be deducted from the amount payable to the contractor, subcontractor, or supplier by the City and County of San
Francisco under this contract a penalty of $50 for each person for
each calendar day during which such person was discriminated
2
against in violation of the provisions of this contract.
In addition to potential monetary liability, a contractor who violates
the terms of the agreement is considered an "irresponsible bidder"
for all future contracts and may not act as a contractor for any public
works contract for San Francisco during the next two years or until it
institutes a program in compliance with the nondiscrimination provisions."3
Thus, while the ordinance is on its face directed at city officials,
the impact will be felt fully by contractors. If contractors do not provide benefits to registered domestic partners equivalent to those provided to spouses, they face statutory penalties and lose the ability to
contract with the city. Significantly, the ordinance does not simply
outlaw discrimination with regard to employees working on the city
contract or in San Francisco. A city contractor may not discriminate
in the provision of benefits between domestic partners and spouses
anywhere it does business during the term of a contract. Thus, an
employer like United Airlines must provide domestic partner benefits to its Chicago and Washington D.C.-based employees as well as its
San Francisco-based employees, at least in every location where a
domestic partner may be registered.'"

1

Id. § 12B.2(i).

13

See id. § 12B.2(j).

It is this nationwide impact that in large part motivated the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA) to sue San Francisco to stop enforcement of the ordinance. In its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for SummaryJudgment, the ATA stated:
The ordinance expressly applies nationwide to all the employees and
domestic partners of employees of ATA and AIRCON [the Airline Industrial Relations Conference] member air carriers with operations at
SFO [San Francisco International Airport]. It is not limited to individuals employed here or to domestic partners registered or living in
San Francisco. It purports to extend benefits wherever in the United
States airline employees work, and wherever the domestic partner of
any airline employee is registered as such.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Air
Transp. Ass'n of America v. City & County of San Francisco, No. C-97-1763 CW
(N.D. Cal. filed May 13, 1997).
14
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The ordinance directly affects 8000 businesses and entities
(including nonprofit entities) that compete annually for city contracts.' - The reaction of these entities has varied.
Some have amended their employee benefit plans to provide
domestic partner benefits and to meet the requirements of the ordinance. For example, large banks such as Wells Fargo, NationsBank,
and Union Bank have announced that they will offer health and
dental benefits to homosexual and heterosexual domestic partners
of employees starting in January 1998.16 Other entities are considering whether to provide domestic partner benefits. The University of
California has $62 million in contracts with San Francisco but currently does not provide domestic partner benefits. The board of regents and president of the university are now considering whether
the university should provide domestic partner benefits to its employees.'
At least one entity has negotiated and compromised with the
city over compliance with the ordinance. After initially objecting to
the ordinance on moral grounds, Catholic Charities, with $5 million
in city contracts, reached an agreement with San Francisco allowing
its employees to designate a "legally domiciled member of the employee's household" as a domestic partner. 8
Finally, some affected entities have sued the city to stop enforcement of the ordinance. In May 1997, the Air Transport Association of America (ATA), an airline industry trade group, filed suit
against the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco
15 See San Francisco Requires Domestic Partner Benefits
for City ContractorEmployees,
Nov. 29, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 683108.
16 See Mark Calvey, Wells Fargo, UnionJump on Benefits Bandwagon,
S.F. TIMES, July
18, 1997, at 22; Don Lee, On Account of Image, Wells Fargo Has New Ads Up Its Sleeve,
L.A. TIMESJuly 23, 1997, at D2. It has been reported that small companies are having a much more difficult time finding insurers to provide such benefits. See, e.g.,
Ilana De Bare, Small Firms Find S.F PartnerLaw Hard To Handle; Buying Insurance
Could Be Impossible, Some Fee4 S.F. CHRO.,Jan. 29, 1997, at Al.
17 See Pamela Burdman, UC Pressed on Partner Benefits; Controversy Looms
Over
Compliance With SFLaw,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 1997, at Al; Carol Ness, PartnerBenefits
for UC? Regent's Mold Planfor Unmarried Couples in Attempt to Keep System Competitive,
S.F. ExAmINER,JUly 16, 1997, atA4.
Rachel Gordon, DetailingDomestic PartnerBenefits; Officials Work Out Wrinkles
Before Law Takes Effect, S.F. EXAMiNER, Mar. 1, 1997, atA5; Patricia C. Roberts, Critics
Wary of Archdiocese Compromise in San Francisco,CHRISTIANrry TODAY, Apr. 28, 1997, at
79.
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Human Rights Commission, and the San Francisco Airport Commission." It claims that the ordinance is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, the Railway Labor Act, and ERISA. 20 It also contends
that the ordinance violates the Constitution.2'
United Airlines, an ATA member, has been particularly impacted by the ordinance. At the time the ordinance was passed,
United was negotiating a twenty-five year lease at the San Francisco
Airport worth at least $13.4 million. Because the airline did not provide domestic partner benefits, the future of its city contract was in
doubt.2 In the end, United was granted a two-year grace period in
which it might comply with the ordinance. 5
In June 1997, PM&M Electric, Inc., also filed suit against San
Francisco seeking to avoid enforcement of the ordinance." PM&M
alleged that it would like to contract with San Francisco but is unable
to do so because it does not provide domestic partner benefits.
PM&M claimed that the ordinance is unenforceable for various reasons, including ERISA preemption.
b.

Impact on Cities Other than San Francisco

San Francisco's ordinance may eventually impact businesses and
other entities that do not contract with San Francisco. San Francisco
passed the ordinance with the hope that it would be modeled elsewhere. According to published reports, this may be true. CNBC has
reported that the ordinance has become a model in California;2 a
similar ordinance is expected to be passed in West Hollywood, California.16 Other cities such as New York, Seattle, New Orleans, and

19 See Air Transp.Ass'n, No. C-97-1763 CW.
20

See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at

2, Air. Transp. Ass'n, No. C-97-1763 CW.
21 See id. at 2-3.
See Peter Kaplan, Airlines Challenge Benefits Mandate; Gay Rights Groups Condemn
Law Suit, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 1997, atAl.
2
See Burdman, supra note 17, at Al. The ATA, of which United is a member,
filed suit during the grace period. This enraged city officials, who threatened to
boycott United for city travel. See The Best Revenge: A Proposed City Boycott of United
Airlines Springs From Anger and Isn't the Wisest Way to Win Domestic Partners' Coverage,
S.F. EXAMINER, July 10, 1997, at A20. United is also being picketed by gay rights
groups. See Bay Area Datelines,S.F. ExAMINER,July 13, 1997, at A16.
24 See PM&M Elec., Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. C-97-2250
CW (N.D. Cal.
filedJune 17, 1997).
25 See How to Succeed in Business (CNBC television broadcastJuly
5, 1997).
See id. West Hollywood Council Member Steve Martin has opined, "I think it's
going to be real common 10 years from now." Id.
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Los Angeles are reportedly considering similar ordinances.2 Consequently, San Francisco's ordinance is very significant. It is currently
being applied to nationwide operations of businesses who have contracts with the city. Further, it is being considered as a model by cities nationwide for similar adoption.
B. Background to ERISA and its Preemption Clause
Before ERISA's passage in 1974, the regulation of employee
benefits was left largely to the states. During the 1960s and early
1970s, Congress became concerned that this regulation was inadequate and at times counterproductive. It believed that many workers
who had been promised benefits were not receiving them.28 Congress also believed that employee benefit plans and plan sponsors
faced a maze of different and often conflicting state laws and regulations that resulted in administrative inefficiencies and costs that ultimately hurt plan participants.2
Congress therefore created in ERISA a uniform, comprehensive,
and detailed body of federal law. That law includes a wide variety of
rights, obligations, and remedies. First, ERISA contains detailed reporting and disclosure requirements designed to furnish plan participants with full information regarding their rights. 9 ERISA also
contains standards governing plan fiduciaries who exercise discretionary authority over plan management and assets." For pension
plans, ERISA contains vesting, benefit accrual, and funding standards. 2 ERISA also enumerates a set of exclusively federal remedies

See Himelstein, supra note 2, at 98; Neubome, supranote 2, at
lB.
See29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988); see also 120 CONG. REc. S29950 (1974) (statement
of Sen. Bentsen) ("Government statistics indicate that during 1972 alone more than
15,000 pension plan participants lost retirement benefits because their pension
plan terminated with insufficient assets to meet all plan obligations").
See 120 CONG. REc. H29197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent)
("With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."); id. at
29933 (statement of Sen. Williams) ("It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the
conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations,
thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation
of employee benefit plans."); id. at 29942 (statement of Sen. Javitz); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1990); Fort Halifax Packing Co.
v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105
(1983).
SO See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
3 See id. §§ 1002(21) (A), 1104, 1109.
32 See id. §§ 1053-1086.
28
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for violations of ERISA 3 3 Congress considered these rights, obligations, and remedies essential to fulfilling its purpose in passing
ERISA, which was to
protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for approj~riate remedies, sanctions, and
ready access to the Federal courts.
Just as essential to Congress was the preemption of state laws
that might interfere with the operation of federal law and plan management. ERISA therefore preempts certain state laws that "relate
to" an employee benefit plan: "Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 35
In preempting state laws that "relate to" any employee benefit
plan, Congress chose some of the broadest available language. The
House version of ERISA would have preempted state laws that "relate
to" a few very specific things-"the reporting and disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities acting on behalf of" ERISA
plans, as well as pension plan funding and vesting requirements."6
The Senate version would have preempted state laws that "relate to
the subject matters regulated by the Act."3 7 It was only in the final
joint conference that the present language was adopted, preempting
laws broadly relating to employee benefit plans themselves."
Congress also demonstrated the breadth of preemption in its
wide definition of "state law." State law includes "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law,"39
and this includes municipal ordinances like San Francisco's. A
3

35

See id. § 1132.
Id. § 1001(b).
Id. § 1144(a).

Other provisions exempt certain laws from the application of

this general preemption provision. See, e.g., id. §§ 1144(b)(2), 1144(b)(4),
1144(b) (7). For example, § 1144(b) (2) (A) exempts some state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Section 1144(b)(4) exempts generally applicable criminal laws, and § 1144(b)(7) exempts qualified domestic relations orders. See id.§§ 1144(b) (4), 1144(b) (7).
37

H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 514(a) (1974).
Id. § 699(a).

See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974) (identical to the 1974 Senate

report No. 93-109).
, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
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"state" is defined as "a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purport to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans covered by this subchapter."40
ERISA's preemption clause was not an insignificant item.
Rather, Congress viewed it as vital. One of ERISA's sponsors, Representative Dent, noted that many considered the preemption provision "the crowning achievement of this legislation" as it reserved to
federal authority "the sole power to regulate the field of employee
benefit plans."" Senator Williams, another sponsor, stressed that the
provision was "intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of
State or local governments or any instrumentality thereof, which
would have the force or effect of law."'42
II. THE CHANGING FACE OF ERISA PREEMPTION
A.

PreemptionPre-Traveler's
1. The Supreme Court's Method of Analysis

Until New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Traveler's Insurance Co.43 in 1995, the Supreme Court took Congress at its
word. Employing a textualist approach, the Court attempted to apply the phrase "relate to" as it believed Congress had intended, embracing the phrase's breadth. The Court described the preemption
clause as "deliberately expansive"" and "conspicuous for its
breadth."45
An excellent illustration of the Supreme Court's pre-Traveler's
approach to preemption is found in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.'
Shaw was concerned with the effect of ERISA preemption on two
New York laws: the Human Rights Law (prohibiting discrimination
by employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy) and the Disability Benefits Law (requiring employers to pay sick leave benefits to
employees unable to work because of pregnancy).47 Delta Airlines
and other companies provided medical and disability benefits under
Id. § 1144(c) (2).
120 CONG. REc. H29197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
42 Id. at 29933 (statement of Sen. Williams).
0s514 U.S. 645 (1995).
44 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46
(1987).
45 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
40

41

46
47

463 U.S. 85 (1983).
See id.
at 88.

1998]

ERISA PREEMPTION

935

ERISA but did not provide pregnancy benefits." These companies
filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that ERISA preempted
these laws.49
The Supreme Court agreed with Delta that both of the laws
"related to" employee benefit plans.' To reach this conclusion, the
Court looked first to the language of ERISA's preemption provision.8 ' The Justices stated, "The breadth of §514(a)'s preemptive
reach [codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985)] is apparent from that
section's language." 52 Likewise, the Court noted that Congress had
used "the words 'relate to' in §514(a) in their broad sense." '
In light of the provision's breadth, the Court gave the phrase
"relate to" the legal definition that it has used ever since. "A law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. " - The
Court felt bound to give full effect to the language that Congress had
chosen. In fact, the Court expressly rejected two possible limitations
on the scope of preemption, insisting that statutory language would
not allow it. First, the Justices refused to preempt "only state laws
specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans."55 Similarly,
the Court refused to preempt only state laws "dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like."5 The Court turned to the legislative history noted above and found significant that Congress had rejected
similar language limiting preemption when it adopted the broader
"relate to" language. 5'
Based upon its broad reading of the statute, the Court had no
trouble finding that New York's Human Rights and Disability Benefits Laws both "related to" employee benefit plans. The laws went directly to the structure of benefit plans and to specific benefits to be
provided."
See id. at 92.
49 Se id.
s See id. at96.
51 See id.
52 Shaw, 463 U.S.
at 96.
53 Id. at
98.
54 Id. at 96-97.
5 Id. at 98.
"
Id.
5 See id.
58 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100. Despite finding that the laws
"related to" employee
benefit plans, the Court found the Human Rights Law preempted only to the extent that it prohibited practices lawful under federal law. See id. at 108. The Court
48
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In the years following Shaw, the Supreme Court continued to
apply the preemption clause broadly. The Court found state laws
preempted even when the laws were not specifically designed to deal
with ERISA plans. For example, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
9
Dedeaux,"
the High Court found that eight tort and contract claims
brought under Mississippi law were preempted. The Court explained that "we have emphasized that the preemption clause is not
limited60to 'state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit
plans.'"
The Supreme Court also determined that state laws could be
preempted even when they merely had an indirect effect on ERISA
plans. Under what the Justices called the preemption clause's
"broad common-sense meaning," a state law "may 'relate to' a benefit
plan, and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not specifically
designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect." 6' In Met6 2
ropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
for example, the Court
found that a Massachusetts law requiring that certain minimum
mental health care benefits be provided to Massachusetts residents
who were insured under general insurance policies, accident or sickness insurance policies, or employee health care plans that covered
hospital and surgical expenses was preempted.6 3 The Court did so
finding that the law "bears indirectly but substantially on all insured
benefit plans.""
The Supreme Court has even found preempted state laws that
were designed to be consistent with ERISA and further its purposes.
For instance, Georgia passed a statute barring garnishment of
"[f]unds or benefits of [an] ... employee benefit plan or program
subject to... [ERISA]. " 6 The Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc. found that Georgia had passed the law to further ERISA's goals to protect plan assets, yet the Court considered
this irrelevant to the preemption question.
"The possibility
that... [the Georgia law] was enacted by the Georgia Legislature to
found that the Disability Benefits Law was not preempted because it could be complied with through creation of a separate plan exempt from ERISA under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (3) (1988). See id. at 108-09.
59 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
Id. at 47-48 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98).
61 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
62

471 U.S. 724 (1985).

65

See id. at 739.

64

Id.

65

Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 (1988)

(alterations in original).
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help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes... is not enough to
save the state law from preemption. " "
That is not to say that the Supreme Court interpreted the preemption clause as limitless. In Shaw, the Court, in an oft-quoted
footnote, opined that some state laws, while relating to ERISA plans,
may be related in such a tenuous way as not to be within the scope of
its provision: "Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans
in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding
that the law 'relates to' the plan."67 The Supreme Court itself never
defined what it meant by a state action whose effect might be so
"tenuous, remote, or peripheral." The Court left that task to lower
federal court judges, who vary greatly in their definition of what such
a state action might be. 8
Without so stating, the Supreme Court may have found a state
action to be "too tenuous, remote or peripheral" in Mackey. In
Mackey, while one section of the Georgia garnishment statute referred specifically to ERISA plans, another section of the statute did
not." This section contained extremely general language and neither singled out nor specifically mentioned ERISA plans of any
kind. 0 Still, certain plan trustees objected to the general garnishment statute, noting that while the statute was general on its face,
Id. at 829.
Shawv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
68 Several United States courts of appeals developed multifactor
tests to determine whether state laws tenuously affected an ERISA plan. For example, in Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991),
the Eighth Circuit set forth seven relevant factors in evaluating preemption: (1)
"whether the state law negates an ERISA plan provision"; (2) "whether the state law
affects relations between primary ERISA entities"; (3) "whether the state law impacts
the structure of ERISA plans"; (4) "whether the state law impacts the administration
of ERISA plans"; (5) "whether the state law has an economic impact on ERISA
plans"; (6) "whether preemption of the state law is consistent with other ERISA provisions"; and (7) "whether the state law is an exercise of traditional state power." Id.
at 1344-45. The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, evaluated two principal factors to determine whether a state law should be preempted: (1) whether it involves a traditional
exercise of state authority, and (2) whether it affects relations among the "principal
ERISA entities--the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the plan beneficiaries." Sommers Drug Stores v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th
Cir. 1986). In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987),
the Sixth Circuit adopted the two factors from Sommers and added a third: "the incidental nature of any possible effect of the state law on an ERISA plan." Firestone,
810 F.2d at 556. See alsoJeffrey A. Brauch, Health Care ProvidersMeet ERISA: Are Provider Claims For Misrepresentationof Coverage Preempted?, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 497, 500-11
(1993).
69 Mackey, 486 U.S.
at 828-29.
70 See id.
at 831.
67
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the garnishment provisions could be used to garnish assets in ERISA
plans, subjecting the plan to administrative burdens and costs." The
Court agreed that some burdens and costs might result from application of the statute. 2 The Court, however, found that ERISA did not
preempt the statute."
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that ERISA plans
could face several types of lawsuits. 7 4 Some could relate to plan benefits. Others could simply be run-of-the-mill state law claims regarding things like unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts
committed by an ERISA plan.75 Because the plans could be sued for
these ordinary claims, some mechanism was required for satisfying
judgments that might result. Considering ERISA itself did not provide an enforcement mechanism, the Court reasoned that state law
enforcement mechanisms must not be preempted. The Court also
found significant that there was no congressional intent to bar such
enforcement mechanisms. 7
Mackey was the exception however. Until Traveler's the Supreme
Court consistently maintained that the preemption provision was
broad, and the Court broadly applied it.
2.

Application of Pre-Traveler's Preemption Analysis To
San Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances

Almost undoubtedly, the Supreme Court would have found San
Francisco's Domestic Partner Ordinance preempted before 1995. At
that time, the Court interpreted the phrase "relate to" extremely
broadly. Indeed, there was almost a presumption that a state law
that came anywhere near the realm of employee benefits was preempted.
While the ordinance restricts San Francisco's ability to contract
and only indirectly impacts the employee benefit plans of employees,
the Supreme Court likely would have seen the ordinance as an attempt to force certain employers to provide domestic partner benefits. The Court would have turned to Shaw, in which it found New
York's attempt to require employers to provide pregnancy benefits to
relate to employee benefit plans.
71 See id.
72

See id.

73 See id. at 841.
74 See id. at 832.
75

See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 832-33.

76

See id. at 835-38.

77 See id. at 838.
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The Court likely would have turned to two other decisions to
support the conclusion that San Francisco's ordinance is preempted.
The first is FMC Corp. v. Holliday,78 involving a Pennsylvania antisubrogation law that barred reimbursement of benefits (usually
medical expenses) paid by an insurer from a tort-claimant's recovery.
As it did in Shaw, the Court in FMC began with congressional language, noting that the preemption provision is "conspicuous for its
breadth."" The Court reaffirmed that a state law may be preempted
even if it is not deliberately designed to affect ERISA plans or does
not deal specifically with the subjects covered by ERISA.80
A major consideration for the Court was that the Pennsylvania
law prevented sponsors of employee benefit plans from structuring
their plans as they wished. Any other holding would leave employee
benefit plans subject to differing state laws regulating the content of
employee benefit plans. "To require plan providers to design their
programs in an environment of differing state regulations would
complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits.""1
Had San Francisco's ordinance come before the Supreme Court
prior to Traveler's, the Court also likely would have found Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.8 helpful. In Alessi, the Court found that
ERISA preempted a New Jersey law that prohibited insurers or employee benefit plans from offsetting amounts payable under retirement plans by amounts the retiree received in workers' compensation benefits.83 The Court found the New Jersey law only indirectly
regulated ERISA plans, but considered that irrelevant. 4 While the
impact on employee benefit plans was indirect, the law barred one
method of calculating benefits that was expressly permitted by federal law. Thus, it affected the structure of ERISA plans.
Before Traveler's, relying on Shaw, FMC, and Alessi, the Supreme
Court likely would have had no trouble finding San Francisco's ordinance preempted. The scope of preemption was viewed as broad,
certainly broad enough to cover an ordinance whose effect is to require contractors to structure their plans to provide domestic partner benefits.
78

498 U.S. 52 (1990).

Id. at 58.
90See id.
79

a] Id. at 60.
8

451 U.S. 504 (1981).

83 See id. at 524.

See id. at 525.
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B. PreemptionPost-Traveler's
What gives San Francisco hope now is that the Supreme Court
has changed its approach to the preemption clause. That change
began with Traveler's in 1995 and has been refined in two 1997 cases.
This section will examine each decision and lay out the Court's current approach to preemption.
1.

New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Traveler's Insurance"

Traveler'sinvolved a New York law requiring hospitals to collect a
surcharge from patients who were insured by companies other than
Blue Cross or Blue Shield." Those patients were required to pay an
additional thirteen percent of their bill to the hospital and eleven
percent to the state. The law also imposed a surcharge on HMOs
that could run as high as nine percent of aggregate monthly charges
paid by an HMO for its members' in-patient hospital care. Traveler's
Insurance, which provided insurance for many employee benefit
plans, sued claiming that ERISA preempted New York's law."
The district court agreed." The court found that the law raised
the costs of operating an ERISA plan and therefore "related to" the
plan.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed.9 ' The Second Circuit noted that the exclusive purpose of
the statute was to increase the costs faced by certain insurers and
benefit plans and that it powerfully interfered with choices that
ERISA plans could make as to how to provide benefits.9 Particularly,
it acted to induce ERISA plans to choose Blue Cross and Blue Shield
to provide insurance for plan participants."
The Supreme Court reversed." In doing so, the Court took a
new approach to the preemption question. Rather than beginning
with ERISA's breadth or a presumption that ERISA preempts most
state laws coming near it, the Court started with the opposite propo-

514 U.S. 645 (1995).
See id. at 649.
See id. at 650.
as See id. at 651-52.
8
See id. at 652.
90 See id.
91 See Traveler's,514 U.S. at 653.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 668.
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sition: There is a presumption against the preemption of state laws,
9
even in ERISA
The Court took a new approach to ERISA's text. While recognizing that the "relate to" language is "clearly expansive," it insisted
that the language could not be read as broadly as it sounded. Indeed, "[i]f 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would
never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.'"97 Rather than looking at "relate to" as a definitional term,
the Court in Traveler's viewed it as a term limiting the scope of preemption-and an unsuccessful limiting term at that.
Thus, the Court found it needed to take a new approach, rejecting what it called its own former "uncritical literalism."98 The Justices
insisted that they "must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law
that Congress understood would survive. " "
As to ERISA's objectives, the Court affirmed what it had always
said before about the purpose of preemption. The preemption
clause was designed to ensure that the regulation of employee benefit plans was a federal concern and to eliminate the threat of inconsistent and conflicting state laws.'9 9 The Court reviewed the provision's legislative history and declared that "the basic thrust of the
preemption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee
benefit plans."'0 '
Examining some of its past decisions in light of its new approach and its interpretation of ERISA's objectives, the Court found
that the results in several of those cases would not change. The
Court found that in Shaw, for example, it had "no trouble finding"
that New York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law related to benefit plans because they required the provision of certain
types of benefits.'0 2 Similarly, the Court found that the Pennsylvania
and New Jersey laws held preempted in FMC and Alessi would still
95 See id. at 654.

See id. at 655.
Traveler's,514 U.S. at 655 (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 656.
9

97
9
'0

Id.
See id. at 656-57.

'o' Id. at 657.
102

See id.
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have been preempted under its new approach. "In each of these
cases, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated employee benefit
structures or their administration."'03
The Supreme Court insisted that the New York law at hand was
significantly different from those in Shaw, FMC, and Alessi in both its
purpose and effect.'" The purpose, according to the Court, was not
to target benefit plans or to mandate benefits. Instead, New York
imposed the charge differential for two reasons. First, Blue Cross
and Blue Shield paid the hospitals promptly and efficiently, and second, they provided coverage to patients who other commercial insurers rejected as unacceptable risks.'" Both of these facts, thought
New York, justified a certain protection for Blue Cross and Blue
Shield under New York law.
As to effect, the Court conceded that the law certainly would affect ERISA plans. The law did "make the Blues more attractive (or
less unattractive) as insurance alternatives" and thus had "an indirect
economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including
ERISA plans." °6 But this effect, to the Court, was not a problem.
That an ERISA plan faced different incentives or even higher costs as
a result of a particular state law was fine.' 7 This was very different
from a law that bound plan administrators to a particular choice.
New York's law did not require the plans to provide certain benefits
as did the laws in Shaw, FMC, and Alessi:
An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself; commercial insurers and
HMOs may still offer more attractive packages than the Blues.
Nor does the indirect influence of the surcharges preclude uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply
bears on the costs of benefits and the relative costs of competing
insurance to provide them.'08
Thus, the Court found a significant distinction between whether the
state law required a plan to structure itself in a certain way or
whether the state law simply influenced the plan's economic incentives.

104

Id. at 658.
See Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 658.

1o

See id.

103

106

107
108

Id. at 659.
See id. at 659-60.
"
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The Supreme Court was quick to clarify that it was not declaring
that all state laws indirectly impacting employee benefit plans are
automatically sheltered from preemption:
We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or
effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law
might indeed be preempted under [section] 514.109
To the Court, the significant distinction was not simply that the law
had only affected the plan indirectly, but that the indirect effect
merely influenced the plan and did not bind it.
As a further rationale for its decision, the Court found significant that the New York law operated in a field that has been traditionally regulated by the states-hospital and health care regulation.'
The Court argued that if New York's law were preempted
almost any state law regulating hospital costs or health care would
likewise be preempted. The Court insisted that all such regulations
imposed some costs on employee benefit plans, yet Congress could
not have intended to preempt all of them.
While Congress's extension of preemption to all "state laws relating to benefit plans" was meant to sweep more broadly than "state
laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, reporting,
disclosure, fiduciary responsibility and the like," nothing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation that historically has
been a matter of local concern."'
The Court felt that if Congress had intended to preempt such
traditional state regulation, it would have made some mention of
that fact in either the language of ERISA or its legislative history.
Legislative silence on the point told the Court that Congress had not
intended to preempt such traditional state regulation.
In the end, the Court concluded that New York's law affected
"only indirectly the relative prices of insurance policies, a result no
different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local
regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to
eliminate."" 2

Id. at 668.
110 See Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 664-65.
I Id. at 661 (citation omitted).
li Id. at 668.
'0
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1997 Refinements to the Traveler's analysis

The Supreme Court decided two cases in 1997 in an attempt to
explain the new scope of preemption."'
a.

Dillingham

In February 1997, the Supreme Court decided CaliforniaDivision
of Labor StandardsEnforcement v. Dillingham Construction,N.A.' 4 In Dillingham, the Court ruled that California's prevailing wage law was not
preempted."' The prevailing wage law required a construction company working on a state contract to pay the prevailing minimum
journeyman wage to its workers unless the company operated a stateapproved apprenticeship program, in which case it could pay a lower
apprenticeship wage.116
Dillingham Construction was awarded a public works contract as
the general contractor for the construction of a county detention fa• -. subcontracted
electronic installation work to Sound Syscility.117 It
118
Sound Systems Media used apprentices from an aptems Media.
prenticeship program that was not state approved."' The program
was, however, an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA.'2 Although the program was not state approved, Sound Systems Media
paid apprenticeship rather than journeymen wages.' 2 ' California's
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement declared that both Dillingham and Sound Systems Media had violated the prevailing wage
law and ordered that a certain amount of funds due to be paid to
Dillingham under the contract be withheld.ln Dillingham sued the
claiming that
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
2
ERISA preempted the prevailing wage law.1
113 The Supreme Court decided a third preemption case in 1997 as well.

See
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). In Boggs, the Court found preempted the
application of Louisiana's Community Property Laws in a dispute over annuity and
pension benefits. See id. at 1767. The decision is not relevant to this Article, as it
did not consider whether the state law "related to" an employee benefit plan because the state law directly contradicted federal law and was preempted on that basis
alone.
114117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
115 See id. at 842.
116 Seeid. at 835.
117 See id. at 836.
118

119

See id.

See id.
1o See DiUingham, 117 S. Ct. at 836.
121 See id.
12 See id.
123 See id.
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The district court agreed with Dillingham that the California law
"relates to" employee benefit plans, but found that the law was not
preempted because it was "saved" from preemption by a savings
The court of appeals reversed. 2 ' The Ninth Circuit found
clause.
that California's prevailing wage law was preempted and not saved
from preemption under the savings clause. 26
The Supreme Court reversed.'2 The Justices began by laying
out the framework for deciding preemption cases. The Court declared that the preemption question is a two-part inquiry: A law is
preempted if it either (1) "has a connection with" or (2) refers to an
employee benefit plan.' The Court interpreted the "refer to" prong
as follows: "Where a State's law acts immediately and exclusively
upon ERISA plans, as in Mackey, or where the existence of ERISA
plans is essential to the law's operation, as in GreaterWashington Bd. of
Trade and Ingersoll-Rand, that 'reference' will result in preemption. " "
Regarding the "connection with" prong of the test, the Court
expressly reaffirmed the new approach it took in Traveler's two years
before. "Two terms ago, we recognized that an 'uncritical literalism'
in applying this standard offered scant utility in determining Congress' intent as to the extent of §514(a)'s reach."'" "Rather, to determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look
both to 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of
the state law that Congress understood would survive ... ' as well as
to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans."' 3' The
Justices likewise affirmed the Traveler's Court's finding that in areas
of traditional state regulation2 there is a strong presumption against
the preemption of state law.
Having framed the analysis, the Court applied it to the prevailing wage law. Dillingham's first argument was that because the law
was specifically designed to deal with apprenticeship programs-and
the apprenticeship program in this case was an ERISA plan-the law
"referred to" ERISA plans and was preempted under the first prong
14

15
26
27

128
12

See id.
See id. at 837.
See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 837.
See id.
See id. at 837.
Id. at 838.

ISO Id.

1 Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)).
See DiUinghaia,117 S. Ct. at 838.
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of the test." The Supreme Court disagreed. Significant to the
Court was that, while some apprenticeship programs are ERISA
plans, others are not." 4 The Court stated that to be an ERISA plan a
program must be funded through a separate trust fund. 3 The Court
noted that, while some apprenticeship programs are funded through
separate trust funds, others are funded directly out of an employer's
general assets." Because the state law could apply to both ERISA
plans and non-ERISA plans, it did not "refer to" ERISA plans. The
state law "is indifferent to the funding, and attendant ERISA coverage, of apprenticeship programs. Accordingly, California's prevailing wage statute does not make reference to ERISA plans. " "
The Court next turned to the "connection with" prong of the
test. The Court started by reviewing its past decisions. In Dillingham,
as it previously had in Traveler's,the Court expressly affirmed its earlier decisions in Shaw, FMC, and Alessi that where certain benefit
structures are mandated by state law ERISA preempts the state law .
But the Supreme Court maintained that the statute in Traveler's was
very different. Crucial to the Court was that the New York hospital
surcharge law in Traveler's exercised only an "indirect economic influence" on employee benefit plans and did not bind the plans to a
particular choice or function as a regulation of the plan itself. "' The
Court also asserted that New York's law did not impact the preemption provision's goal, which is to prevent imposition of a variety of
state laws on ERISA plans.' 40 Indeed, as it did in Traveler's, the Court
insisted that Congress would not have preempted such long-standing
laws without having made clear its purpose to do so.' 4 '
The Supreme Court then turned to California's prevailing wage
law and found that the law was "indistinguishable" from New York's
surcharge law. 42 First, the Court noted that prevailing wage laws are
a traditional form of state regulation; in fact, California had enacted
14
its prevailing wage law forty years before Congress passed ERISA 3
Conceding that this alone would not be enough to shelter the law
13S
134

See id.
See id.

"3

See id.

13

See id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
See Dillinghart 117 S. Ct. at 839.
See id. at 839-40.
See id. at 840.
See id. at 840-41.
See id. at 840.
See id.

13

1
1

1
1

"4
'4'
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from preemption, the Court coupled it with one other fact. The
California law had nothing to do with the "areas with which ERISA is
expressly concerned-'reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,
and the like.'"'" It was this combination that the Court found powerful: There was a long-standing tradition of state prevailing wage
regulation and the regulation was remote from ERISA's core concerns. The Court accordingly found that4 there was a heavy presumption against preemption of the state law.' The second important factor leading the Court to conclude that
the prevailing law was indistinguishable from New York's surcharge
law was that the law did not bind Dillingham Construction or Sound
Systems Media to anything.
No apprenticeship program is required by California law to
meet California's standards. If a contractor chooses to hire apprentices for a public works project, it need not hire them from an approved program (although if it does not, it must pay these apprentices journeymen wages). So, apprenticeship programs that have not
gained the approval of the California Apprenticeship Council (CAC)
may still supply public works contractors with apprentices. Unapproved apprenticeship programs also may supply apprentices to private contractors. The effect of the California law on ERISA apprenticeship programs, therefore, is merely to provide some measure of
economic incentive to comport with the state's requirements, at least
to the extent that those programs seek to provide apprentices who
can work on public works projects at a lower wage. ' 4
Crucial to the Court was that the prevailing wage law acted only
as an incentive and not a binding force. Contractors who did not
wish to have a benefit program of the type California approved could
still perform public works contracts with California; it would simply
cost them more. The contractors would be encouraged to operate
an approved plan, but this was not "tantamount to a compulsion."'47
The Court put it another way, explaining that the prevailing wage law
merely "alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing
ERISA plans.""'
As it did in Traveler's, the Court cautioned against an overbroad
reading on this point. It insisted that there may be some economic
144 Dilhingham, 117 S. Ct. at 840 (quoting New York
State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)).
4
See id. at 841.
'46 Sce
id.
147 Id. at 842.
148 Id.
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incentives that are so strong as to constitute a compulsion. In Dillingham, the Court referred to this danger as a "Hobson's choice." 49
The Court was convinced, however, that in this case Dillingham Construction, Sound Systems Media, and other construction companies
did not face such a choice.' 5
The Court summarized its conclusion by stating:
[W]e could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended
nothing of the sort. We thus conclude that California's prevailing wage laws and apprenticeship standards do not have a
'connection with,' and therefore do not 'relate to,' ERISA
15
plans.
b. DeBuono
The Supreme Court had a second opportunity in 1997 to explain and expand upon its Traveler's decision in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & Clinical Services Fund 5 ' In DeBuono, the Court found another New York state law, this one imposing a 0.6% tax on gross receipts for patient services at hospitals and other treatment facilities,
not to be preempted. 5 3 New York enacted the law to cover a deficit
in its Medicaid account (although tax revenues were placed in the
state's general account).'
The plaintiff, an employee benefit plan
that directly operated three medical centers, paid the tax for a time,
but eventually refused to pay and brought an action seeking a declaration that ERISA preempts the law. 5
The district court rejected the claim.'5 It found that the tax was
generally applicable and did not interfere with the calculation of
benefits or a determination of benefit eligibility.5 7 The court called
the impact on the ERISA plan "incidental."' 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision twice.'" Both times it found the
Id. at n.l11.
M SeeDillingham, 117S. Ct. at842 n.ll.

149

1
152

Id. at 842.
117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997).

153 See id. at 1752-53.
"5 See id. at 1749.

155 See id.

See id. at 1750.
See id.
15
DeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1750.
159 See id. at 1750-51.
'"

15
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law preempted.'6 In its first decision, the court of appeals found
that the law targeted the health care industry, which is the "realm [in
which] ERISA welfare plans must operate." 6' It found a direct relation to ERISA plans because the tax reduced the amount of plan assets that could be used to pay claims.' Faced with the tax, ERISA
plans either would have to charge higher fees to plan participants or
limit benefits.
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In 1995, the Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit
to re-examine the decision in light of Traveler's. " The Second Circuit considered Traveler's and reaffirmed its original decision, again
concluding that because the tax directly depleted the funds of an
ERISA plan it had an immediate impact on the operation of a plan.'"
The defendant again appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the
Supreme Court. ' 6This time the Supreme Court considered the merits of the case
and reversed the Second Circuit's decision.' The Court began by
deciphering "relate to." The Court chastised the court of appeals for
"failing to give proper weight to Traveler's rejection of a strictly literal
reading" of the phrase. 67 The Court insisted that § 1144 could not
be read as expansively as it was written.
The Court went on to discuss its previous attempts to explain
and apply § 1144. Interestingly, it contended that, while its preTraveler's decisions had probably overly-expansively interpreted the
"relate to" text, that interpretation had not led to wrong results. The
Court insisted that until Traveler's it had "not been necessary to rely
on the expansive character of ERISA's literal language in order to
find preemption because the state laws at issue in those cases had a
clear 'connection with or reference to' ERISA benefit plans."'6
According to the Court, it was in Traveler's that the Court was
required for the first time to confront the question of "whether
ERISA's 'relates to' language was intended to modify the 'starting

16

161
162
165
164
165
'6
167
1

See id.
Id. at 1750.

See id.
See id.

See DeBuono, 117 S.Ct. at 1750.
See id. at 175 1.
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
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presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.'' 16 9
As it did in Dillingham, the Court confirmed that where state law occupied an area traditionally regulated by the states there was a strong
presumption against preemption."0 Also as it did in Dillingham, the
Court noted that § 1144's language was not helpful in reaching a decision. Instead, according to the Court, the key was to look to the
objectives of ERISA preemption in deciding whether ERISA preempted a particular state law.""
Turning to the New York law at hand, the Court concluded two
things. First, the tax occupied an area traditionally regulated by the
states-it was an exercise of the state's historic police powers to regulate matters of health and safety.'72 "Respondents therefore bear the
considerable burden of overcoming 'the starting presumption that
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.'"'1 Second, having
found a strong presumption against preemption in this case, the
Court concluded that the hospital tax was not the type of state law
that Congress intended to supplant with ERISA
This is not a case in which New York has forbidden a method of
calculating pension benefits that federal law permits, or required
employers to provide certain benefits. Nor is it a case in which
the existence of a pension plan is a critical element of a state law
cause of action, or one in which the state's statute contains
provi74
sions that expressly refer to ERISA or ERISA plans.
Rather, the law was "one of 'myriad state laws' of general applicability that impose[d] some burdens on the administration of

169

Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

Traveler's Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)).
170 SeeDeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1751.
171 See
172

id.
See id. at 1752.

Id. (quoting Traveler's,514 U.S. at 654).
Id. The Court cited several pre-Traveer'scases that are presumably still good
law. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125
(1992) (a case where the state statute contained provisions that expressly referred
to ERISA or ERISA plans); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)
(an example of a case where the existence of a pension plan was critical to the state
law cause of action); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988) (a case where the state statute contained provisions that expressly referred
to ERISA or ERISA plans); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985) (law requiring employers to provide certain benefits); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (law requiring employers to provide certain benefits); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (a case where the law
forbade a method of calculating benefits that federal law permits).
73

74
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ERISA plans but nevertheless [did] not 'relate to' them within the
meaning of the governing statute."'
The plaintiff argued that this case involved an impact on its employee benefit plan very different from the indirect impact on plans
found to exist in Traveler'sand Dillingham. The plaintiff insisted that
because it owned the hospitals being taxed the tax was being enforced directly upon the plan. While the Court agreed that this case
involved a direct impact, it did not find that fact significant. 76 To the
Court, the impact-while direct-was no different from an indirect
effect that would increase costs on the ERISA plan and might force it
to charge higher rates or limit services. This was not a case where the
economic effect was so acute that it functionally forced the plan to
provide benefits of a certain type or restricted the plan's choices.
"Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some effect on the administration
of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with
such an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute." 77
3.

Impact of Traveler'sand Its Progeny

The Supreme Court in Traveler's, Dillingham, and DeBuono did
not make a complete break with the past. In each case the Court interpreted the preemption clause's purpose the same way it always
had-there should be a uniform federal regulation of employee
benefit plans to avoid conflicting and inconsistent state laws. 178
Moreover, the Court's holdings have affirmed the continuing validity
of several cases decided prior to Traveler's. While the Court no
longer accepts Shaw's broad interpretation of the phrase "relate
to"-in fact, the Court has backed away from that interpretationthe Court reaffirmed the Shaw decision itself.'" It also has consistently affirmed that Alessi, FMC, Ingersoll-Rand, and Mackey were correctly decided. 80
The Supreme Court has, however, significantly changed the law.
The Court has changed both its attitude toward preemption and its
analysis in determining whether a particular law is preempted.
175

DeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1752 (quoting Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 668).

176 See id. at 1753.
177

Id.
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See id. at 1751; California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham

Constr., N.A., 117 S. Ct. 832, 838-40 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-56 (1995).
179 See Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 657.
M See DeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1752 nn.12-15; Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 839; Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 662.
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Change in Attitude: Presumptions and Preemption

Under the Court's current approach, the words "relate to" are
limiting words and are not meant to be taken literally as an expression of the breadth of ERISA preemption. Courts should not presume that state laws are preempted simply because of the breadth of
§ 1144; instead, the presumption is to be otherwise.'8 '
In many ways, the Court has turned to something like the doctrine of proximate causation in tort law. In tort law, while many actions may be a cause in fact of a particular harm, some are so remotely related to the harm as not to be considered significant for
purposes of tort liability. Courts require that an action be a proximate cause of the harm before they will find the actor to be a causal
agent in a particular case.
In a similar fashion, under the Court's new more pragmatic approach to ERISA preemption, while almost any law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan in a literal sense of the term, only those laws
that relate to a plan in a sufficiently significant way will now warrant
preemption.
b.

Change in Analysis.

The next logical question is just how significant must be the relationship between a law and an ERISA plan. The Court's analysis
now involves four separate factors. Each factor applies to the
"connection with" prong of the preemption test. First, the Court will
ask whether the state law operates within a field that has traditionally
been regulated by states or whether it regulates things that are coreERISA concerns.' 8 In many ways this involves a balancing. 83 If the
state law is simply an exercise of the state's police powers and ERISA
has nothing to say about the subject of the law, almost undoubtedly
the Court will presume that the law is not preempted. On the other
hand, if the state law is not an exercise of traditional police powers
or goes to the heart of ERISA's core concerns (such as reporting,
disclosure, types of benefits, and identity of participants and beneficiaries), the law is much more likely to be preempted.
The second factor in the Court's analysis is the purpose of
ERISA preemption. The Court's main concern is whether the state
law will subject the plan to potentially conflicting regulations from
18e See Traveler's,514 U.S. at 655.
12 See DeBuono, 117 S. CL at 1751; Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 840; Traveler's,
514
U.S. at 661-62.
18SSeeDillinghaM, 117S. Ct. at841.

1998]

ERISA PREEMPTION

953

locality to locality and state to state, causing a problem for uniformity.'" The Court must weigh how much the state law causes this proscribed effect.
The third factor relates to a state law's impact on an ERISA
plan. It is no longer the case that any impact-even an indirect impact- on a plan is enough to warrant a finding of preemption.
Reading Traveler's, Dillingham, and DeBuono together, it appears the
courts must analyze the type and amount of impact that the law has
on an ERISA plan. This can be looked at in two distinct ways.
First, each case distinguishes situations in which the law's effect
is direct from those in which the effect is indirect and merely impacts costs or incentives faced by the plan. The point has been
phrased differently. If the effect is so "acute" as to "force an ERISA
plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively
restrict its choice of insurers," the effect is enough to warrant preemption.'8" Likewise, if the law presents a plan with a "Hobson's
Choice" or mandates benefits as opposed to influencing choices,
that law will likely be preempted.'" This, too, involves a weighing.
A second way of analyzing the impact of a state law on the plan
is to determine whether the particular state law fits into a category of
cases that have been found in the past to be preempted. As noted
above, Traveler's, Dillingham, and DeBuono have consistently affirmed
that Shaw, Alessi, FMC, Ingersoll-Rand, and Mackey were correctly decided. Based on these cases, DeBuono set forth several categories or
types of laws that were preempted in those cases and are likely to be
preempted still.'87 State laws are likely to be preempted if they can be
classified as:
(1)State laws forbidding a method of calculating benefits that
federal law permits;
(2) State laws requiring employers to provide certain benefits;
(3) State law causes of action as to which the existence of a pension plan is a critical element; [or]
(4) State laws that explicitly refer to ERISA or ERISA plans.'88
The Court has affirmed that such cases are preempted (and in fact
are clearly so).
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See id. at 838; Traveler's,514 U.S. at 656-57.
Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 668.

See Dillingham, 117S. Ct. at 842 n.ll.
See DeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1752.
18 See i.
:86
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The Court may look to a fourth factor as well, the state law's
purpose. Although this factor has not been as prominent in the
Court's opinions as the other three factors (it was not mentioned in
Dillinghamor DeBuono), it played a role in Traveler's. In Traveler's, the
Court found it significant that New York was merely attempting to

reward Blue Cross and Blue Shield for accepting all patients and for
paying on time. ' " New York was not trying to mandate benefit structures. Thus, just as the Court may look at the impact of a state law
when considering whether the law is preempted, it may also look to
the purpose.
IV. DOES ERISA PREEMPT SAN FRANCISCO-STYLE DOMESTIC PARTNER
ORDINANCES?

In light of the Court's current view, are San Francisco-style Domestic Partner Ordinances preempted by ERISA? Yes. To illustrate
this point, this section will focus particularly on San Francisco's ordinance. While San Francisco's ordinance more than likely does not
"refer to" ERISA plans, it certainly has a "connection with" such
plans, even given the changes in the scope of preemption after Traveler's.
A.

"Refer To"

The first prong of the preemption test is whether the ordinance
"refers to" ERISA plans. According to the Court, a law "refers to" an
employee benefit plan if it acts "immediately and exclusively upon
ERISA plans."1 90
There is no doubt that the law acts immediately upon ERISA
plans. The ordinance forbids San Francisco from contracting with
parties that discriminate in the provision of "benefits."'9 ' San Francisco has made clear that "benefits" includes ERISA plan benefits. 92
Indeed, it is almost certain that ERISA plans will bear the primary
burden of complying with the ordinance.
ERISA plans, however, do not bear the entire burden, and that
factor is significant in the way the Supreme Court interprets the
"refer to" prong. The key case in this context is Dillingham. In Dillingham, the Court recognized that California's prevailing wage law
10 See Traveler's, 514 U.S. at 658.
,:0 Dillingham,117 S. Ct. at 838.
192

See SAN FRANCiSCo, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12B.1(b) (1997).

See The City of San Francisco, Non-discrimination in City ContractsDomestic Partners, Frequently Asked Questions 1 (1997) (on file with author).

19981

ERISA PREEMPTION

955

would immediately impact ERISA plans. Like the plan at issue in Dillingharm, many apprenticeship plans subject to the law are ERISA
plans. But some are not. Some are funded through general emwith ERISA plans, it
ployer assets. While the law dealt 9 immediately
3
did not deal with them exclusively.'
The same is true with San Francisco's Domestic Partner Ordinance. The ordinance will impact ERISA plans, but not exclusively.
"Benefits" involves more than ERISA-covered benefits. The term includes memberships, travel passes, and parental leave, none of which
is likely to be covered by ERISA.'9
The "refer to" prong of the test will not be critical in any event.
Even if a court finds that San Francisco's specification of clearly
ERISA benefits (e.g., retirement benefits) amounts to a reference to
an ERISA plan, San Francisco or other cities following its lead could
simply eliminate the problem through more careful drafting and
remove any specific references to clearly ERISA plans.
B.

"Connection With"

The "connection with" prong of the test will be crucial. No
amount of careful drafting will make ordinances like San Francisco's
significandy different in their actual connection with an employee
benefit plan.
Prior to Traveler's, determining whether an ordinance like San
Francisco's was preempted would have been a fairly easy matter. The
Supreme Court's attitude toward preemption has changed, however,
and the Court now takes a much closer look at whether a state law is
preempted. The Court seems willing to leave more room for states
to operate than it did before. In some ways, the three recent decisions can be viewed as readjusting the boundaries between federal
and state power, decreasing the scope of the former and increasing
the scope of the latter.
Despite the Court's change in approach to the scope of preemption, San Francisco's ordinance will still be preempted under
the "connection with" prong. Each of the four factors now employed
by the Court in preemption cases points toward preemption of the
ordinance.

,,See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 839 & n.5.
9
See The City of San Francisco, Non-discrimination in City ContractsDomestic Partners, Frequently Asked Questions 1 (1997) (on file with author).
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1. Field of Regulation
First, San Francisco's ordinance does not occupy an area of traditional state regulation, although it does impact core-ERISA concerns. At first glance, the ordinance looks like an exercise of San
Francisco's police powers, controlling the terms under which it will
perform public contracts. In its ATA litigation,195 San Francisco
makes this point, arguing that the ordinance "deals with a traditional
concern of local government-the terms of City contracts in general,
and the prohibition
on discrimination among the City's contractors
96
in particular.",
But on closer inspection, the ordinance does not simply address
a traditional state function. The ordinance is unique in that it attempts to regulate businesses' treatment of employees in cities removed from San Francisco. It regulates labor markets across the
country. San Francisco cannot argue that its traditional police powers extend this far. Cities traditionally have not sought to modify the
nationwide business operations of companies that do business with
them and within their boarders.
San Francisco's ordinance is very different from the laws in
Traveler's, Dillingham, and DeBuono. In those cases, laws regulating
hospital costs, taxing gross revenues, and regulating prevailing wages
were common and long-standing. In Dillingham, for example, the
Court found significant that prevailing wage laws (not just laws regarding government contracts generally but prevailing wage laws
themselves) existed forty years before ERISA's passage. 97 San Francisco-style ordinances did not exist prior to ERISA and are quite new
in their attempt to target benefit plans nationwide.
Equally as important is the way in which San Francisco's ordinance targets benefit plans, because it goes to the core of ERISA. It
directly impacts the structure of plans. Any entity that desires to
contract with the city must structure its plan to provide domestic
partner benefits. The ordinance goes to the definition of who is a
plan beneficiary, another core-ERISA matter. ERISA permits plan
sponsors to determine whether someone should be a participant or a
beneficiary and under what conditions. Thus, this is not a case in

195 See supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ATA's
litigation against the City of San Francisco.
Defendant's Brief in Support of Cross Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment at 28, Air Transp. Ass'n. of America v. City &
County of San Francisco, No. G-97-1763 CW (N.D. Cal. filed May 13, 1997).
1
SeeDillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 840.
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which a court should presume that the ordinance survives preemption. The presumption should go the other way.
2.

Consistency With the Purpose of ERISA Preemption.

Second, the San Francisco ordinance conflicts with the purpose
of ERISA's preemption provision. Domestic partner ordinances like
San Francisco's are a threat to the uniform regulation of employee
benefit plans. Other cities are now considering domestic partner
ordinances like San Francisco's. They may be identical to San Francisco's ordinance, or they may be different. These cities may choose
to condition the right to contract with the city on providing other
benefits such as pregnancy benefits, paid maternal or paternal leave,
establishing a 401 (k) plan, or a defined benefit pension plan. If one
of these ordinances is acceptable each of them will be. And thus a
plan with nationwide operations may well face differing requirements from different states and localities.
The reach of San Francisco's ordinance is powerful evidence
that the ordinance creates the danger that the preemption clause
was meant to avoid. The ordinance, a local regulation, is applied to
the nationwide operations of companies contracting with the city. A
city contractor must take into account San Francisco's regulation in
providing benefits to employees in Chicago, New York, or Miami (or
any city in which domestic partners may be registered). Thus, ERISA
plans are dependent upon local rules and regulations, the very danger that the preemption provision was enacted to stop.
3.

Nature of Impact on ERISA Plans

The nature of the ordinance's effect on ERISA plans, the third
factor, is the most difficult issue in deciding whether San Francisco's
ordinance is preempted. Yet this factor, too, weighs in favor of preemption.
It is with regard to this factor that San Francisco can make its
strongest argument against preemption. The city can point out that
it drafted its ordinance in order to make the impact on ERISA plans
indirect. The language of the ordinance does not mandate that all
companies in San Francisco or even that all contractors dealing with
San Francisco have benefit plans structured in a certain way. The
ordinance's command is directed to the city to do business in a certain way and to include certain mandatory items in its contracts. The
impact on contractors, while significant, is indirect.
Further, with regard to the ordinance's impact on ERISA plans,
it shares some similarities with the prevailing wage law in Dillingham.
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In Dillingham, the Court found significant that no contractors were
required to pay prevailing wages.' 8 Contractors simply faced a
choice. If they wanted to pay apprenticeship wages rather than journeymen wages, they had to adopt a state-approved plan; the choice
was theirs. In the same way, San Francisco might argue that its ordinance leaves businesses with a choice. No business is required to
provide domestic partner benefits. If businesses desire to contract
with the city, though, they must provide these benefits; the choice is
theirs.
In fact, this is exactly the position San Francisco has taken on
the matter, both in and out of court. Leslie Katz, a member of San
Francisco's Board of Supervisors, has stated, "We as a city may set the
terms with the respect to those that we contract with. If they don't
want to contract with us, they don't have to.""
In its litigation with the ATA, San Francisco has made two arguments regarding the choices contractors have. First, just as construction companies in Dillinghamcould choose not to sponsor stateapproved apprenticeship programs, companies can choose not to
contract with San Francisco.2 Second, businesses can continue to
contract with the city and still not alter their ERISA plans by choosing to "provide benefits to domestic partners (and spouses) via an
arrangement that was entirely separatefrom an ERISA plan, such as
(i) payment for domestic partners' benefits out of general assets, (ii)
a separate group insurance contract, or (iii) the purchase of individual insurance contracts."20'
Neither argument is persuasive. As to the first argument, San
Francisco's ordinance is very different from Dillingham's prevailing
wage law in regard to choice. In Dillingham, a public works contractor could still participate in state construction projects even if it did
not have a state-approved apprenticeship program; it was simply required to pay higher journeymen wages. The law affected the contractor's costs but it did not affect its ability to participate. That is
not the case in San Francisco. Businesses that do not change their
benefits packages to meet San Francisco's standards may not contract with the city. All companies contracting with the city must have
San Francisco's mandated benefits structure.

,98See id. at 841.
199 Kaplan, supra note 22, at
Al.
20
See Defendant's Brief in Support of Cross Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 29, Air Transp. Ass'n, No. C-97-1763 CW.
"' Id. at 28.
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If ever there was a Hobson's choice, this is it. The ordinance's
impact is so acute that it will be impossible for some businesses to
continue without complying with the requirements. One sign of the
ordinance's impact is the number of businesses scrambling to
change their benefit structures to meet the requirements of the ordinance. 2 This is not just a tax or a surcharge. It does not simply
impact the costs that ERISA plans face. It tells employers the types
of benefit plans they must have.
In this way the ordinance is much more like the laws found to
be preempted in Shaw, FMC, and Alessi than the law in Traveler's. Just
as New York forced employers to provide pregnancy benefits in Shaw
and Pennsylvania forced plans to eliminate subrogation clauses in
FMC, San Francisco is forcing contractors to provide domestic partners benefits. This case falls into DeBuono's category of preempted
state laws that require "employers to provide certain benefits."" '
At this point San Francisco turns to its second choice-based argument and insists that a contractor can comply with the ordinance
without changing its ERISA plans at all. In its ATA litigation, San
Francisco contends that while "ERISA is concerned with certain
benefits for employees," the ordinance is not.2 The ordinance is concerned with benefits for domestic partners. Therefore, a city contractor
can comply with the ordinance wholly apart from ERISA, by giving
benefits to domestic partners directly from general corporate assets,
for example.0'
This argument is quite weak. First, ERISA is implicated by giving benefits to a spouse or a dependent of an employee. ERISA
regulates the provision of benefits through employee benefit plans
to both plan participants (usually employees) and their beneficiaries
(usually dependents of employees). 0 6 That the spouse (or domestic
partner) of an employee is a recipient of health benefits from an
employer does not mean the employee has not benefited. Indeed,
the only reason the employer gives health insurance to the spouse is
to benefit its employee. The spousal benefit is a form of compensation to the employee. The employer recruits employees by providing

203

See, e.g., Calvey, supra note 16, at 22.
DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1752

(1997).
Defendant's Brief in Support of Cross Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for SummaryJudgment at 28, Air. Transp. Ass'n, No. C-97-1763 CW.
MSee
200

id.

ERISA makes clear throughout that Congress is concerned with the provi-

sions of benefits to employees and their dependents. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (a),
(b), (c), 1002(1), (8), 1132(a) (1985).
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benefits to employees and dependents. There simply is not a bright
line between providing benefits to an employee and providing benefits to a spouse or domestic partner of an employee. All benefits are
truly benefits to the employee-and will generally be covered by
ERISA as long as they are provided through a benefit plan.
Further, even if a contractor could somehow draft a separate,
non-ERISA plan to provide benefits to domestic partners of employees equal to those employees' spouses, the plan would not satisfy the
nondiscrimination requirements of the ordinance. Assume, for example, that a contractor chooses to provide the same retirement
benefits to the domestic partner of an employee out of general assets
that it currently provides to spouses of employees through an ERISA
plan. The spouse's interest is protected by ERISA. That means that
not only does the contractor promise to pay retirement funds someday, but that under ERISA's funding requirement money is being set
aside now (and is required to be set aside now) and invested so that
funds will be available at retirement.02 7 ERISA also provides for vesting of those funds and a guarantee that funds will be paid, even if
the contractor's business fails, through the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBG). 0 8
The domestic partner provided the non-ERISA plan has none of
the same protections. He or she has the promise that funds will be
paid someday out of general assets. There is no funding requirement and there is no PBGC protection in the event the contractor's
business fails. The domestic partner will stand in line with other
general creditors seeking to recover some of the promised money.
Thus, the separate plan "choice" that San Francisco offers to
contractors is an illusion. Only through ERISA can domestic partners be put in the same position as spouses. In the end, the ordinance has a significant impact on ERISA plans. It compels contractors to structure their ERISA plans as San Francisco wants them to.
According to DeBuono, it is one of those types of laws that are preempted because it requires "employers to provide certain benefits."'"
Significantly, if the San Francisco ordinance survives preemption, then many other types of coercive laws must also survive. States
through indirect means could impose laws like those found to be
preempted in Shaw, Alessi, and FMC. States could condition receiving certain other benefits, perhaps very significant benefits from the
See id. §§ 1081-1086.
208 See id. §§ 1053-1054, 1322.
20

20

DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 1752
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state, upon maintaining benefit plans that provide such things as
pregnancy benefits or contain anti-subrogation clauses. As in San
Francisco's case, the benefit could be the ability to contract with the
state. More seriously, the benefit potentially could be the ability to
do business in the state at all. A state law could provide that if a
company wants to be licensed to do business in the state it must have
a state-approved benefit structure. While the impact is technically
indirect and no one is technically forced to provide such benefits,
the effect is so acute as certainly to fall within the exception described in Traveler's.
San Francisco-style domestic partner ordinances also fall within
the acuteness exception. Their impact on contractors is quite severe
and they essentially mandate that employers provide city-approved
benefits. They are preempted under ERISA and should be struck
down.
4.

Purpose of the Ordinance

Finally, not only is the effect of the ordinance to force employers to restructure benefit plans, so is its purpose. In Traveler's, the
Court found relevant the fact that New York was not trying to force
plans to provide certain types of benefits; rather, it was merely attempting to reward Blue Cross and Blue Shield for making payments
on time and for insuring patients that other companies would not.10
In contrast, San Francisco has no purpose other than to induce
businesses into providing domestic partner benefits. It is social activism on the part of San Francisco. San Francisco hopes that this is a
way to induce employers to provide what it already provides to its
own employees. The ordinance forces contractors to adopt certain
benefit structures-and that is its clear purpose.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of ERISA preemption in its last three terms. That narrowing, however, will not save
San Francisco's Domestic Partner Ordinance.
Both in its design and effect, the ordinance tells city contractors
how to structure their ERISA plans-what benefits to provide and to
whom to provide them. The ordinance also mandates this benefit
structure not only for employees working in San Francisco or on

210 See NewYork State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Traveler's
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658 (1995).
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contracts with San Francisco, but for employees nationwide. The ordinance goes to the core of ERISA.
It is also the very type of law that Congress meant to preempt.
Congress was very concerned that ERISA plans not be subject to state
and local regulations that might vary or conflict. San Francisco is attempting to regulate national plan structure through local regulation, and it is not alone. Several other cities are waiting in the wings
preparing to enact their own ordinances. Allowing enforcement of
such ordinances will mark a return to the pre-ERISA world in which
employee benefit plans were subject in large part to state and local
regulation.
That a company can choose not to contract with San Francisco
is no answer. This is not a law, like those recently approved by the
Court, that only marginally increases the costs or alters the incentives
faced by an ERISA plan. A company cannot contract with San Francisco at all unless the company provides the city-approved benefit
structure. The impact of the ordinance on ERISA plans is significant
and severe.
San Francisco is free to pursue social activism. It will have to do
so, however, by means other than altering the structure of employee
benefit plans.

